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Lehr v. Robertson: A Constricted View of
the Rights of Putative Fathers
I. Introduction
Historically, adoption laws did not require that notice and
an opportunity to be heard be given a putative father' before
termination of his parental rights.2 In 1972, the Supreme Court,
in Stanley v. Illinois,3 altered the traditional view by requiring
notice and a hearing for a putative father involved in a custody
proceeding.4 The philosophy of Stanley has since been extended
to protect the right to notice and hearing of putative fathers in
adoption proceedings.' In a series of decisions6 concluding with
Lehr v. Robertson7 the Supreme Court has clarified the extent
and type of notice sufficient to meet the constitutional require-
ments of Stanley.8
In Lehr, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
a New York statutory scheme9 for notification which listed seven
1. A putative father is "[t]he alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979).
2. See Weinhaus, Substantive Rights of the Unwed Father: The Boundaries are
Defined, 19 J. FAM. L. 445, 445 (1981).
3. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
4. Id. at 658. For a discussion of the ramifications of Stanley, see Bodenheimer,
New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change,
49 S. CAL. L. REv. 10 (1975); Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After
Stanley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115 (1973-1974) [herein-
after cited as Comment, Problems in Implementation]; Comment, The Emerging Con-
stitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1581
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Emerging Protection].
5. Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 54-55.
6. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
7. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
8. See generally Bodenheimer, supra note 4; Note, Putative Fathers: Unwed, But
No Longer Unprotected, 8 HoFsTmR L. REV. 425 (1980); Comment, Problems in Imple-
mentation, supra note 4.
9. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111-a(2)(a) to -a(2)(g) (McKinney 1982) states that the
following persons must receive notice:
(a) any person adjudicated by a court in this state to be the father of the child; (b)
any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the United
1
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categories of putative fathers who must receive notice prior to
termination of parental rights."0 The Court weighed the need to
protect the interest of a putative father in his child against the
state's objective of facilitating the adoption of illegitimate chil-
dren and concluded that the notification procedure offered by
section 111-a of the New York Domestic Relations Law1 ade-
quately protected an informed and interested putative father.12
States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the court order has
been filed with the putative father registry, pursuant to section three hundred
seventy-two-c of the Social Services Law; (c) any person who has timely filed an
unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of the child, pursuant to section
three hundred seventy-two-c of the Social Services Law; (d) any person who is
recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's father; (e) any person who is
openly living with the child and the child's mother at the time the proceeding is
initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child's father; (f) any person
who has been identified as the child's father by the mother in written, sworn
statement; (g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six
months subsequent to the birth of the child and prior to the execution of a surren-
der instrument or the initiation of a proceeding pursuant to section three hundred
eighty-four-b of the Social Services Law.
Id. Amendment of the statute added the following category:
(h) any person who has filed with the putative father registry an instrument ac-
knowledging paternity- of the child, pursuant to section 4-1.2 of the estates, powers
and trusts law.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a(2)(h) (McKinney Supp. 1983).
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 1983) (1983 version of the statute is similar
to the version in effect at the time of the Lehr decision) established the putative father's
registry that was at issue in Lehr-
1. The department shall establish a putative father registry which shall record the
names and addresses of. . . (b) any person who has filed with the registry before
or after the birth of a child out-of-wedlock, a notice of intent to claim paternity of
the child . . . . 2. A person filing a notice of intent to claim paternity of a child
or an acknowledgement of paternity shall include therein his current address and
shall notify the registry of any change of address pursuant to procedures pre-
scribed by regulations of the department. 3. A person who has filed a notice of
intent to claim paternity may at any time revoke a notice of intent to claim pater-
nity previously filed therewith and, upon receipt of such notification by the regis-
try, the revoked notice of intent to claim paternity shall be deemed a nullity nunc
pro tunc. 4. An unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of a child may be
introduced in evidence by any party, other than the person who filed such notice,
in any proceeding in which such fact may be relevant. 5. The department shall,
upon request, provide the names and addresses of persons listed with the registry
to any court or authorized agency, and such information shall not be divulged to
any other person, except upon order of a court for good cause shown.
Id.
10. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2994-96.
11. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1982).
12. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
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Part II of this note examines the development of a putative
father's constitutional rights. Part III presents the opinion in
Lehr and Part IV analyzes it. Part V concludes that the consti-
tutional guarantees of notice and hearing afforded a putative fa-
ther are not absolute, but are based on the strength of his rela-
tionship with his child. Although the categories created by
section 111-a generally include most putative fathers interested
in their children's welfare, the court failed to exercise its discre-
tionary powers of notification in Lehr's case.
II. Background
Prior to 1972, a putative father had limited due process pro-
tection of his liberty interest in the welfare or custody of his
child." Traditionally, custody of the child remained with the
mother, and her consent alone sufficed to terminate all parental
rights and free the child for adoption.' 4 Scattered cases recog-
nized certain rights of a putative father. 5
In Stanley v. Illinois," the Supreme Court altered this
traditional view of a putative father's rights and interest in his
child.1 7 Under an Illinois statutory scheme," the death of the
mother of an illegitimate child made that child a ward of the
state even if the putative father was alive and interested in re-
taining custody."' The Court held that due process required that
13. See Comment, Problems in Implementation, supra note 4, at 116-18; see gener-
ally Comment, Emerging Protection, supra note 4.
14. See Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 54.
15. See In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 463-64, 134 N.W.2d 126, 132 (1965) (an un-
wed father interested in obtaining custody of his illegitimate child must receive notice
and must be afforded an opportunity to be heard at legal proceedings concerning the
child); In re Zink, 269 Minn. 535, 538-39, 132 N.W.2d 795, 797-98 (1964), and In re Zink,
264 Minn. 500, 507-08, 119 N.W.2d 731, 736 (1963) (both holding that a putative father
who appears at an adoption proceeding is entitled to be heard, present evidence, and
cross examine witnesses).
16. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
17. For a general survey of the impact of Stanley upon the rights of a putative
father, see Bodenheimer, supra note 4; Weinhaus, supra note 2; Comment, Problems in
Implementation, supra note 4; Comment, Emerging Protection, supra note 4.
18. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14, as cited in Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650. Under this
statute, "parent" included unwed mothers, adoptive parents, or the father or mother of a
legitimate child. Therefore, unwed fathers were not considered parents.
For the current codification of the definition of "parent," see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, §
9.1-1(E) (Smith-Hurd 1975).
19. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
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a putative father be afforded a fitness hearing before his chil-
dren became wards of the state.20 The Court reasoned that a pu-
tative father like Stanley who had raised and provided for his
children had a recognizable liberty interest in his children de-
serving of constitutional protection.21 The Court concluded that
the Illinois statutory definition of "parent, ' 22 which included
only unwed mothers and legally married parents, violated the
equal protection clause.23 Stanley fell outside this definition by
virtue of his status as an unwed father.2 4 Since he was similarly
situated to other natural parents by virtue of his interest in his
children, he could not be denied equal protection of the laws
because of the absence of a marriage contract between him and
the mother of the children. 25 Stanley guaranteed a putative fa-
ther interested in obtaining or retaining custody of his child the
right to a fitness hearing.26
The immediate impact of Stanley was a revision of adop-
tion statutes throughout the United States to include reference
to a putative father's existence.27 In response to Stanley, New
York commissioned a study of the legal implications of a puta-
tive father's rights.2 8 Revisions of section 111-a of the New York
Domestic Relations Law created seven categories s of putative
20. Id. at 658.
21. See id. at 656-58.
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14, cited in Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650. See 8upra
note 18.
23. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 658.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, supra note 4, at 61 & n.267, 65-75 (changes in Oregon
and California); Comment, Problems in Implementation, supra note 4, at 132-33 &
n.92, 138-47 app. (change in Michigan and a survey of rights of a putative father in all
fifty states); Comment, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of
Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517, 527-28 (change in Michi-
gan) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Strange Boundaries]; cf. Doe v. Department of So-
cial Servs., 71 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1972) (reinter-
preting New York law in light of Stanley).
28. See Governor's Memorandum on approving L. 1976, ch. 665, 1976 N.Y. Laws
2442-43. Recommendations of the Temporary State Commission on Child Welfare re-
sulted in the recodification of N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a, which was in dispute in Lehr
v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983). See, e.g., In re Jessica, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 428, 430
N.E.2d 896, 901, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20, 25 (1980) (citing the recommendations of the Tempo-
rary State Commission).
29. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111-a(2)(a) to -a(2)(g) (McKinney 1982); see supra note
[Vol. 4:477
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fathers, based on the interest they display in their children, who
automatically receive notification of legal actions involving their
children.30 Those who are not included in one of the seven cate-
gories have no right to notice and a hearing.3' The right to be
heard includes the right to present evidence on whether the ac-
tions contemplated for the child represent the child's best
interests.3 2
In 1978, the Supreme Court restricted the scope of Stanley
in Quilloin v. Walcott. 33 In Quilloin, a putative father, who had
occasionally given his son presents, sporadically visited him, but
never consistently supported the child, received notification of a
pending adoption by the natural mother and her husband.3 4 The
putative father opposed the adoption, since it would terminate
his visitation rights.3 The Supreme Court held that the refusal
to grant the putative father veto power over the proposed adop-
tion did not represent a denial of due process.36 The Court also
rejected Quilloin's equal protection claim, stating that a distinc-
tion made in the adoption statute3 7 between the legal rights of
the mother and of the father rested on factors other than the sex
of the parent. 8 The distinctions made by the Court in Quilloin,
like those in Stanley, rested on the degree of interest the puta-
tive fathers had displayed in their children.3 9
A statute similar to the one upheld in Quilloin was struck
9.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. The Domestic Relations Law provides in relevant part: "The sole purpose of
notice under this section shall be to enable the person served pursuant to subdivision
two to present evidence to the court relevant to the best interests of the child." N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a(3) (McKinney Supp. 1983).
33. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
34. See id. at 249-51.
35. Id. at 250.
36. Id. at 256.
37. GA. CODE § 74-403(3) (1975), cited in Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248. Under this sec-
tion, the consent of the mother of an illegitimate child sufficed to free the child for adop-
tion unless the father had legitimated the child according to the provisions of GA. CODE §
74-103 (1975). Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248 n.3.
38. See Qui~loin, 434 U.S. at 256.
39. See, e.g., Weinhaus, supra note 2, at 453; 29 EMoRY L.J. 833, 842 (1980); Note,
supra note 8, at 431; Comment, Illegitimacy and the Rights of Unwed Fathers in Adop-
tion Proceedings After Quilloin v. Walcott, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 383, 392 (1979).
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down in Caban v. Mohammed" where the Court was faced with
a challenge by a father who had assumed a nurturing role similar
to that of the mother.4 The New York statute4 permitted the
mother alone to block the father's adoption petition.42 The
Court held that this distinction, based purely on gender, vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
The majority did not address Caban's claim 4 that his sub-
stantive due process rights had been ignored since section 111-a
did not require a finding of parental unfitness before parental
rights could be terminated. 46 Caban's basic Stanley rights to no-
tice and hearing were protected, since he had an opportunity to
be heard at his children's adoption proceedings.' 7
The decision in Caban is narrow, holding only that the right
to block an adoption cannot be accorded to one class of parents
purely on the basis of gender.48 A statute which bases the veto
power purely on gender without taking into account the strength
of the parental relationship violates equal protection." Caban
had a substantial relationship with his children." The concern
of the majority in Caban was for just this type of putative fa-
ther. The Court reasoned that although the right to block an
adoption does not automatically vest in a putative father, the
father of an older child who has developed a substantial rela-
40. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
41. Id. at 389.
42. N.Y. DoM. REL.. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977) (in effect at the time of the Caban
decision). A child could not be freed for adoption without the consent of the parents of a
legitimate child or the mother of an illegitimate child. These basic consent provisions
were still in effect when Lehr was decided. Lehr never touched the consent issue since
the father was never even notified of the proceeding.
43. Caban, 441 U.S. at 386-87.
44. Id. at 394. The gender based distinction did not "bear a substantial relationship
to the State's asserted interest." Id. (footnote omitted).
45. Note, supra note 8, at 435.
46. Id. at 385. For portion of statute relevant to this discussion, see supra note 9.
Caban based his substantive due process claim on the Court's holding in Quilloin which
"recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a parental relationship
with their children absent a finding that they are unfit as parents." Id. at 385 (citing
Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246 (1978)).
47. Caban, 441 U.S. at 384.
48. Id. at 394.
49. Id. at 389.
50. Id.
[Vol. 4:477
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tionship with that child should be accorded such a right.51 On
the other hand, a parent who had not legitimated his child or
developed a significant relationship does not possess this right.2
The Court emphasized that the rights accorded to Caban arose
from the fact that his children were older." In a footnote, the
Court suggested that a different type of statutory scheme could
be structured to deal with the adoption of newborns as opposed
to older children who had ties to their fathers.5 4
The dissent by Justice Stevens55 was concerned with the
possible retroactive application of the Caban holding. 6 Untold
millions of adoption decrees have been entered without notice to
putative fathers.5 ' Retroactively applying Caban would force the
reopening of these adoption decrees which might cause disrup-
tion of long standing family units.58 The majority never touched
the retroactivity issue.
Caban and Quilloin dealt with the veto power of a putative
father over a proposed adoption. By use of such a power, a puta-
tive father could prevent the legitimation of his child into an
existing family unit. Since the court is always concerned with
the best interests of the child, 9 this right to a veto power is not
easily retained. Lehr v. Robertson,60 however, dealt with a con-
stitutional right more basic than the veto power. Lehr, unlike
Caban and Quilloin, was not afforded notice and an opportunity
to be heard." Thus, while Caban and Quilloin were all present
at legal proceedings involving their children and were able to
present evidence, 2 Lehr was never afforded this opportunity.6 3
51. Id. at 392.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 392 n.11.
55. Id. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting). There was an additional dissent written by
Justice Stewart. Id. at 394 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 415-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see notes 136-37 and accompanying
text.
57. Caban, 441 U.S. at 415 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2991 (1983).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2987.
62. The surrogate court consolidated Caban's adoption petition and the petition ini-
tiated by the mother into a single hearing. Caban, 441 U.S. at 383.
The superior court consolidated Quilloin's writ of habeas corpus, petition for legiti-
1984]
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III. Lehr v. Robertson
A. The Facts and Lower Court Opinions
Jonathan Lehr and Lorraine Robertson had lived together
for approximately two years before their daughter was born."
Lehr visited Lorraine in the hospital after the child was born."
During the next several years, however, he provided no financial
or emotional support.66
On January 30,1979, Lehr filed a paternity petition in West-
chester Family Court.67 He had not been notified that the natu-
ral mother and her husband had filed an adoption petition on
December 21, 1978, in Ulster County Family Court.8 The
mother informed the Ulster County court of the pending pater-
nity action.6 She also requested that venue for the paternity pe-
tition be changed to Ulster County.70 Since Lehr fell outside the
seven categories of putative fathers who automatically receive
notification of pending legal actions involving their children,"
the change of venue request was his first indication that his
daughter was the subject of an adoption petition.7
mation, and objection to the adoption with the adoption petition initiated by the mother
and stepfather into a single hearing. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 250-51.
Failure to receive notice was not the basis of Stanley's claim. Stanley objected to the
presumption that as an unwed father his parental rights could be terminated without a
preliminary finding of unfitness. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
63. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2990. The Court stated that the primary purpose of notifica-
tion under § 111-a was to enable a person served to provide evidence on the best inter-
ests of the child. Id.
64. In re Jessica, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 422, 430 N.E.2d 896, 897, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21
(1981), aff'g 77 A.D.2d 381, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772 (3d Dep't 1980), aff'g 102 Misc. 2d 102, 423
N.Y.S.2d 378 (Fain. Ct. Ulster County 1979), af'd sub nom. Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S.
Ct. 2985 (1983).
65. Brief for Appellant, Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). The parties disputed whether Lehr attempted to
visit the daughter, Jessica, and was denied this privilege. Id.; Brief for Appellees, Lehr v.
Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
66. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2988.
67. Id.
68. In re Jessica, 102 Misc. 2d 102, 104, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (Fam. Ct. Ulster
County 1979).
69. Id. at 105, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
70. Id. at 106, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
71. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(a)(2)(a) to -(a)(2)(g) (McKinney 1982); see supra
note 9.
72. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2989.
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On March 7, 1979, prior to the return date for the change of
venue motion, the judge signed the adoption decree, refusing a
request for an adjournment.73 The judge also ruled that it was
within the trial court's discretion to withhold formal notification
before the finalization of the adoption decree from the father.4
Six weeks later, the Supreme Court held in Caban v. Mo-
hammed 7 that section 111-a of the New York Domestic Rela-
tions Law,76 requiring pre-adoptive consent of the mother and
not of the father of an illegitimate child, violated the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment." Upon refusal of
the trial court to vacate the adoption order, the putative father
appealed to the appellate division, seeking a retroactive applica-
tion of Caban.7 8 The appellate division denied the relief re-
quested and affirmed the trial court's ruling.79 The dissent, how-
ever, reasoned that since the trial judge knew the father's
identity, it was an abuse of discretion not to notify him before
the issuance of the final decree.80
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed both the constitu-
tionality of the notice provisions of section 111-a81 and the trial
judge's exercise of discretion in withholding formal notification
before the finalization of the adoption decree from the father.82
The court observed that the notice statute was specifically
designed to meet the due process requirements of Stanley v.
Illinois ."
The dissent reasoned that the purpose of the statutory
scheme is to reduce the possibility of the entrance of adoption
73. In re Jessica, 102 Misc. 2d at 106, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 381. The judge had all the
necessary social service reports on hand before signing the adoption papers. Id. at 105,
423 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
74. Id. at 111, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
75. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
76. N.Y. DOM REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977) (current version at N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAW § 111 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1983)); see supra note 42.
77. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394.
78. In re Jessica, 77 A.D.2d 381, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772 (3d Dep't 1980).
79. Id. at 383, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
80. Id. at 385, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 775 (Mikoll, J., dissenting).
81. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 111-a(2)(a) to -a(2)(g) (McKinney 1982); see supra note
9.
82. In re Jessica, 54 N.Y.2d at 421, 430 N.E.2d at 897, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
83. Id. at 428, 430 N.E.2d at 900-01, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (citing the implications of
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
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decrees without adequate constitutional notice to putative fa-
thers.8 4 Although Lehr fell outside the statutory categories of fa-
thers who must receive notice,85 as a known father he should
have received notice under section 111(3)," which specifically
gives the trial court discretionary notification powers.87 The dis-
sent found that it was an abuse of this discretion not to notify
Lehr."
B. The Supreme Court
1. Majority
In Lehr v. Robertson," the Supreme Court rejected plain-
tiff's due process and equal protection challenges. The Court
held that New York's statutory notification scheme 0 adequately
protected the liberty interest of a putative father who developed
a substantial relationship with his child. 1
Accepting the facts as certified, the Court held that the
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard at an adoption
proceeding is not a fundamental right which automatically vests
in a putative father." A biological link represents only the first
step in the maintenance of a parent-child relationship,98 which
must be nurtured in order to grow into a liberty interest. Ac-
84. In re Jessica, 54 N.Y.2d at 432-33, 430 N.E.2d at 903, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 27
(Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 433, 430 N.E.2d at 903, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 27 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
86. The Domestic Relations Law provided:
Notice of the proposed adoption shall be given in such manner as the judge or
surrogate may direct and an opportunity to be heard thereon may be afforded to a
parent who has been deprived of civil rights and to any other parent whose con-
sent to adoption may not be required pursuant to subdivision two, if the judge or
surrogate so orders. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the notice
of a proposed adoption nor any process in such proceeding shall be required to
contain the name of the person or persons seeking to adopt the child.
N.Y. Dom. RaL. LAW § 111(3) (McKinney 1977) (current version at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW.
§ 111(3) (McKinney Supp. 1983)).
87. In re Jessica, 54 N.Y.2d at 433 n.1, 430 N.E.2d at 903 n.1, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 28 n.1
(Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 436, 430 N.E.2d at 905, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 29 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
89. 103 S. Ct. at 2995-97.
90. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a(2)(a) to -a(2)(g) (McKinney 1982); see supra note
9.
91. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
92. Id. at 2987.
93. Id. at 2993.
[Vol. 4:477
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cording to the Court, a liberty interest worth protecting is one
which the individual himself values and attempts to preserve."
Since Lehr never developed a significant relationship with his
daughter during the first two years of her life, his interest in
parenting never developed into the type of interest worthy of
constitutional protection. 5
The New York statutory scheme places the responsibility
for protecting a liberty interest in an illegitimate child with the
putative father. By either filing a notice of intent" or registering
with the putative father registry,'97 a father such as Lehr auto-
matically becomes entitled to receive notice and to be heard at
any proceeding involving his child. The Court held that the
scheme swept broadly enough to include those fathers desirous
of protecting their liberty interests."
The majority dismissed Lehr's equal protection claim, not-
ing that mothers and fathers who assume similar nurturing roles
encounter equal treatment under the law."9 The mother in Lehr
assumed complete parental responsibility for the child, while the
father provided neither financial nor emotional support.100 The
different roles assumed by each parent permitted the state to
assign different legal privileges to each class without violating
the Constitution.0
2. Dissent
The dissent reasoned that the statutory scheme did not pro-
tect a father in Lehr's position.10 2 Lehr claimed that Lorraine
Robertson refused to allow him to visit Jessica and often hid her
whereabouts from him, thus making it impossible for him to
protect his liberty interest by developing a substantial relation-
ship with the child. 03
94. Id. at 2993-94.
95. Id. at 2994.
96. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a(2)(c) (McKinney 1982); see supra note 9.
97. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 111-a(2)(b) (McKinney 1982); see supra note 9.
98. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
99. Id. at 2996-97.
100. Id. at 2996.
101. Id. at 2996-97.
102. Id. at 3000-01 (White, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2997 (White, J., dissenting).
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After Lehr initiated his case, New York added a section'"
to its Domestic Relations Law to prevent maternal obstruction-
ism from depriving a father of the opportunity to develop a rela-
tionship with his child.105 The dissent noted that the new provi-
sion states that a father can not be deprived of his right to
consent to an adoption, if he was prevented from seeing the
child by the custodial parent or agency.106 These consent provi-
sions are a product of the Caban decision."0 " Since only the fa-
ther with a developed relationship retains a veto power over an
adoption, the state is obligated to protect a father's right to
maintain such a relationship.108
The dissent viewed the rights of putative fathers in absolute
terms.109 Therefore, a statutory scheme based on the strength of
parental ties can determine only the type of hearing afforded a
father and not whether such a hearing will be given at all." 0 The
liberty interest is fundamental, requiring substantial due process
protection."' Without considering the equal protection claim,
the dissent reasoned that the denial of due process was a suffi-
cient constitutional basis to overrule the state court holding.1 1
IV. Analysis
In cases involving putative fathers, the Supreme Court bal-
ances two sometimes competing interests: the liberty interest of
the putative father in maintaining a relationship with his child
and the state's interest in promoting the adoption of illegitimate
children."' The constitutional requirements which force the
state to inform a putative father of the pending adoption of his
child and provide him with an opportunity to .present evidence
104. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 111(1)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1983).
105. Id. The consent of a known and interested putative father must be obtained
before a child is surrendered for adoption. The mother or other authorized custodian
may not prevent the father from establishing a relationship with his child. Id.; see Lehr,
103 S. Ct. at 2998 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
106. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2998 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2998 (White, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 2999 (White, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 3001 (White, J., dissenting).
113. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 2995 (1983).
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at the adoption proceeding may delay the adoption process. 1 4
Statistics indicate that early placement of children in adoptive
homes minimizes adjustment difficulties for both adoptive par-
ents and children.1 1 5 Since many putative fathers are unknown,
states have attempted to create statutory schemes " which pro-
tect the interested father while not unduly delaying the adop-
tion process.117
Given the Court's philosophy on adoption, ' the majority
in Lehr v. Robertson,'" weighed the interests at stake and found
that the state's interest in adoption was more compelling than
the protection of Lehr's liberty interest. It is clear from the ma-
jority's holding that a putative father's rights are tentative at
best. The fact that the Court recognized these rights at all' 2°
stems from the importance it places on the maintenance of fam-
ily ties.1 2 1 The precedent of Stanley v. Illinois ' added a dimen-
sion to the Court's recognition of the importance of family ties
within the traditional family unit.1 23 Stanley demonstrated that
important family relationships can exist outside the traditional
family unit and that the liberty interest of an involved putative
father deserves due process protection.1 2
4
114. See Comment, Strange Boundaries, supra note 27, at 531.
115. Id. at 523.
116. See supra note 27. The Uniform Parentage Act specifies that the identity of a
putative father should be ascertained if possible before termination of parental rights. If
reasonable efforts do not provide any notion of his identity or he shows no interest in his
child, his rights may be terminated without his presence. The Act presents a six month
grace period in which the father may identify himself, claim lack of notice, and also
request custody. UNIF. PARNTAGE Acr § 24(e), 9A U.L.A. 616 (1973).
117. See Comment, Strange Boundaries, supra note 27, at 526.
118. The Supreme Court does not often review a case involving family court issues
since these matters have been traditionally regulated by the states. When the Court does
review state statutes as in Lehr, it begins with a recognition of the realities of the possi-
ble family situations open to an illegitimate child. The Court is pro-adoption since adop-
tion is viewed as being in the best interests of the child: placement in a stable home
environment without the stigma of illegitimacy. The pro-adoption slant is especially
strong in cases in which the prospective adoptive parents are the mother and stepfather.
See Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2991.
119. 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
120. See id. at 2993.
121. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
122. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
123. See Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2992.
124. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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Beginning with Stanley, the Court showed its willingness to
extend due process protection to those putative fathers who
demonstrate a familial relationship with their children. The ma-
jority in Lehr'25 held that in light of the plaintiff's undeveloped
relationship with his child, he resembled the father in Quilloin
v. Walcott' 6 rather than the father in Caban v. Mohammed."27
Quilloin never supported his child, never married the mother,
nor showed an interest in the child's upbringing.1 28 He objected
to the termination of his parental rights, but never wished to
assume custody of the child.1 2 ' In a similar manner, Lehr re-
mained a virtual stranger to his child during the first two years
of her life.'80 In Quilloin and Lehr, the contemplated adoptions
represented the legal recognition of an existing family unit.'3 1
The Court's rejection of Lehr's view of his due process rights
reflects a desire to protect and foster existing family
relationships. 3 2
The Court in Lehr looked at the realities of the family situ-
ation. Allowing the father to participate in the proceeding would
not change what the Court saw as the best result for the child:
her legitimation into an existing family. The father in Lehr, like
the father in Quilloin, never petitioned for custody of his
child. 13' His original petition requested visitation rights only.,,
When he learned of the pending adoption, his attempt to be in-
cluded in the process was not an attempt to obtain custody of
his daughter, but rather a desire to be included in any proceed-
ing involving his parental rights.135
Lehr suggested that his case required a retroactive applica-
125. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2996.
126. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
127. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
128. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
129. Id. at 247, 256.
130. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2988.
131. Quilloin's son had lived with his mother and her husband for nine of his eleven
years. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 246. Lorraine Robertson married her husband when Jessica
was nine months old. Brief for Appellees, Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983)
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
132. See Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2995 n.22.
133. See id. at 2988-89.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 2989.
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tion of the Caban holding.18 6 The Court did not discuss retroac-
tivity directly, 1-7 but suggested that the philosophy of the Caban
holding would apply to Lehr if he had been in the same type of
family situation as Caban.138
The majority in Lehr viewed the plaintiff as someone who
had been afforded ample opportunity to protect his interests
and had failed to do so. 13 Since he initiated a paternity petition
and acquired representation by counsel by December, 1978,140 he
knew or should have known of the statutory scheme of section
111-a of the New York Domestic Relations Law141 and could
have complied with its requirements. 142 He could also have cho-
sen to intervene in the adoption proceeding under section 401,
1012(a), or 1013 of the New York Rules of Civil Procedure, 143
but instead chose to collaterally attack the decree.'" In the ma-
jority's view, then, Lehr found himself outside of the adoption
process through his own negligence;"45 the Court was not re-
quired to protect the rights of those unwilling to assert their
rights themselves. 614
The due process analysis suggested by the Court identifies
an important liberty interest to be protected. 47 The Court, how-
ever, qualified this liberty interest in the case of a putative fa-
ther.148 His liberty interest in his child is inchoate, it being his
responsibility to protect that interest. 49 The Court is primarily
concerned with the state's obligation to protect the putative fa-
136. Brief for Appellant, Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
137. See Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2996.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2994-95.
140. Brief for Appellant, Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
141. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 111-a(2)(a) to -a(2)(g) (McKinney 1982); see supra note
9.
142. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
143. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 401, 1012(a), 1013 (McKinney 1972 & 1976).
144. In re Jessica, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 430 n.7, 430 N.E.2d 896, 901 n.7, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20,
26 n.7 (1981).
145. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 2990.
148. Id. at 2993.
149. Id.
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ther's opportunity to develop a liberty interest. " It determined
that the New York statutory scheme provides adequate protec-
tion for the father who wants to be included in his child's life.' 15
The Court stated that the right to receive notice is within a fa-
ther's discretion, 52 but failed to consider the situation of a puta-
tive father who does not know of the very existence of a child or
who has failed to develop a relationship with the child because
of maternal obstruction. In such cases, the father has no discre-
tion to receive notice and his paternal rights may be terminated
before he has the opportunity to develop a significant relation-
ship with his child.
Furthermore, the Court did not consider the issue of
whether the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to
notify Lehr under a separate category of the notification
scheme. " In line with the pro-adoptive stance of courts, the
trial court may have decided to adhere to the letter of the statu-
tory scheme rather than to exercise its discretion under section
111(3) of the New York Domestic Relations Law'" to notify
Lehr even though he fit into none of the seven statutory catego-
ries requiring notice. Since Lehr would have had no veto power
over the adoption even if he had appeared, however, giving him
a right to be heard would have protected his due process rights
at little cost in time to the other parties to the action.
In evaluating Lehr's equal protection claim, the Court ap-
plied the intermediate standard of review used in scrutinizing
classifications based on gender. 5 5 When a classification scheme
separates individuals by sex, it must promote a legitimate state
interest in order to pass constitutional muster.' " In Lehr, the
Court identified several state interests deemed legitimate: facili-
tation of adoption, promotion of the best interests of the child,
and protection of the rights of interested third parties. " 7 The
150. Id. at 2994.
151. Id. at 2995.
152. Id.
153. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111(3) (McKinney 1977); see supra note 86.
154. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 111(3) (McKinney 1977); see supra note 86.
155. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
75-76 (1971).
156. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
157. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
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Court held that the classification scheme is not based purely on
gender, but on the different legal roles assumed by parties. 15 8
The Court found that the classification scheme serves to pro-
mote the identified state interests. 5 9 Litigants similarly situated
receive equal protection of the laws while those such as Lehr,
who have assumed different legal roles, legitimately fall outside
of the system."'0
While the majority in Lehr looked at the realities of the
family situation, the dissent realized that recognizing the fa-
ther's rights to notice and a hearing, while protecting his funda-
mental due process rights, would not change or delay the adop-
tion process. 6 ' The putative father in Lehr never registered with
the putative father registry. 62 The dissent reasoned, however,
that his attempt to have his daughter legitimated through a pa-
ternity petition represented a similar effort.1 3 The trial court
knew of the putative father's existence following the change of
venue motion initiated by the mother."" To deny his existence
for failure to follow the letter of the statutory scheme amounted
to empty formalism not in keeping with the nature of the inter-
ests at stake.10 The dissent also suggested that the presumption
that a father who does not file a notice of intent or register with
the state loses his due process rights reflects the same type of
presumption struck down in Stanley.1"6 The trial court reasoned
that delay in the adoption process was detrimental to the best
interests of the child. 1 7 As the dissent pointed out, however, the
trial court's haste to complete the adoption without notifying
the father led to the appellate process through two New York
courts and finally to the Supreme Court, resulting in a four year
delay of the finalization of the adoption decree.166
158. Id. at 2996.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 3001 (White, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 3000 (White, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 2989.
165. Id. at 3000 (White, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 3000 n.7 (White, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 3001 (White, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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V. Conclusion
When the Supreme Court first carved a special niche for pu-
tative fathers in Stanley v. Illinois,"9 states recodified the no-
tice and consent provisions of their adoption statutes. 170 Many
states require the consent of even unknown and unavailable fa-
thers prior to terminating parental rights. 17 After the Court up-
held the distinctions of Georgia's adoption statute in Quilloin v.
Walcott,17 2 states recognized that the rights accorded to the fa-
ther in Stanley do not attach to all putative fathers, but depend
instead on the relationship the father develops with his illegiti-
mate child. In Lehr v. Robertson,1 7 3 the Court again showed its
willingness to make distinctions between putative fathers based
on the depth of their relationships with their children. The mes-
sage of Lehr is that states do not have to treat putative fathers
as a single class with identical due process rights. Before a puta-
tive father has a liberty interest in his child, he must develop a
substantial relationship with that child. Once such a relationship
exists, a putative father's interest in his child receives full due
process protection.
Given the competing interests at stake in adoption cases in-
volving putative fathers, the courts must balance the liberty in-
terest of the father against the best interests of the child. Statu-
tory schemes must of necessity sweep as broadly as does section
111-a of the New York Domestic Relations Law17 4 to include as
many interested fathers as possible while not unduly delaying
the adoption process by requiring notification of unknown or un-
available fathers. Most putative fathers who do not care to be
involved in the adoption process fall outside the categories of
the statute.
In Lehr, the trial court failed to exercise its discretionary
notification powers. While Lehr was not technically within one
of the seven categories of section 111-a(2), 75 the judge knew of
169. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
170. See supra note 27.
171. See Comment, Strange Boundaries, supra note 27, at 526 (examining Illinois,
Florida, and Georgia statutes).
172. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
173. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
174. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1982).
175. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a(2)(a) to -a(2)(g) (McKinney 1982); see supra note
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his existence and interest in his daughter's welfare. 176 The fail-
ure to utilize the discretionary notification power under section
111(3)177 caused a four year delay in the adoption process. Bet-
ter coordination between the statutory scheme and the discre-
tionary notification power should assure that all interested puta-
tive fathers receive notification of pending adoptions.
Davida S. Scher
9.
176. In re Jessica, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 436, 430 N.E.2d 896, 905, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20, 29
(1981).
177. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(3) (McKinney 1977); see supra note 86.
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